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Britain’s Not-so-Grand Strategy: The Projected
Expedition Against the Texel, 1796
Graeme Callister
The French conquest of the Netherlands in early 1795 left Britain in an invidious strategic
position. Not only had the main British field army been badly beaten, but French dominance
of the Low Countries left her vulnerable to invasion from across the North Sea. The purpose
of this article is to outline one of the British government’s responses to this strategic concern,
in the shape of a proposed expedition in October 1796 to raid and destroy Dutch shipping in
the Texel. This event – or non-event, as the case may be – has been largely overlooked in
the histories of the period. The fullest treatment can be found in Earl Camperdown’s 1898
biography of his great-grandfather, Admiral Adam Duncan, commander of the expedition’s
naval forces.1 Another classic work, John Fortescue’s History of the British Army, offers a
brief account of the planning, heavily skewed towards criticism of Secretary for War Henry
Dundas.2 More recent analyses of British strategy and operations have given the Texel project
little attention. It does not feature, for example, in Robert Sutcliffe’s assessment of British
expeditionary warfare in the 1790s, and it is alluded to only in passing by Roger Knight as
one of ‘a succession of non-events and failures’.3
This lack of attention is understandable. The projected expedition was of relatively small
scale, planned and dispatched without fanfare, and returned without having fired a shot in
anger. It merited a brief mention in the daily newspapers in early November 1796 but made
almost no ripple in the public consciousness. Even the official records of the event are patchy.
1Earl of Camperdown, Admiral Duncan (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898), pp.79-90.
2J.W. Fortescue, History of British Army (20 vols, London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), vol. IV, pp.520-21.
3Robert Sutcliffe, British Expeditionary Warfare and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1793-1815 (Woodbridge: Boy-
dell Press, 2016); Roger Knight, Britain Against Napoleon: The Organisation of Victory, 1793-1815 (London:
Penguin, 2014), p.143.
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Yet the project still affords some interesting insights into British strategic thinking regarding
the Netherlands, and into the relatively slapdash methods of preparing military operations in
the mid-1790s. This article will outline the key features of the proposed expedition, showing
that it was conceived through perceived strategic necessity and that it was predicated on a
presumed lack of Dutch opposition. The article will also outline the military difficulties faced
and will show that these were exacerbated by the lack of detailed planning. In this the 1796
project anticipated in microcosm many of the tropes of future expeditions, including the much
larger Anglo-Russian descent on the Netherlands in 1799.
The decision to launch a spoiling attack on the Dutch fleet was driven primarily by strate-
gic concern for a potential threat to Britain’s southeast coast and London. The Royal Navy’s
defensive strategy of covering the Western Approaches pre-supposed that the enemy’s main
forces would come from the direction of the Bay of Biscay or the Atlantic – the direction of
Spain and France. The prospect of a large and well-manned hostile fleet in the North Sea,
therefore, caused a great deal of consternation, and would indeed prove a key inspiration be-
hind British raids or expeditions in 1798, 1799, 1805, 1809, and 1813-14.4 While there was no
intimation of an immediate threat from that quarter in 1796, the conquest of the Netherlands
had left the sizeable Dutch battlefleet at France’s disposal, and British intelligence sources in
the early months of the year indicated that a good part of this fleet was being fitted out for active
operations.5 The destruction of this force was considered desirable in order to neutralize any
potential threat. Although at this stage Britain possessed neither the available military strength
nor the political will to change a major campaign, an attack by a naval squadron seconded by
land forces was deemed feasible. A memorandum of 1 October even enthusiastically sug-
gested that the expedition might establish a permanent presence on Texel Island, which would
blockade the Texel as effectively as a naval squadron, and at half the cost.6 The orders for
Colonel John Doyle, the commander of the land force of the 1796 expedition, included vague
instructions for the maintenance of troops on the island, but the prospect of creating a ‘Dutch
Gibraltar’ does not appear to have featured seriously in the planning.7 It was, however, con-
sistent with similar suggestions concerning potential British seizures of Dutch coastal islands
4N.A.M. Rodger, ‘Seapower and Empire; Cause and Effect’ in Bob Moore & Henk van Nierop (ed.), Colonial
Empires Compared, Britain and the Netherlands 1750-1850 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p.110; Christopher Hall,
British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-1815 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p.81; Roger
Knight and Martin Wilcox, Sustaining the Fleet, 1793-1815: War, the British Navy, and the Contractor State
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010), p.192.
5H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840 (10
vols, ’S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1905-22), vol. II, p.362, Barclay to Grenville, 26 April 1796.
6The National Archives, London (TNA), WO 1/178, Memorandum 1 October 1796.
7TNA, WO 1/178, Dundas to Doyle, 10 October 1796.
Academia Letters, August 2021
Corresponding Author: Graeme Callister, graemecallister@gmail.com
Citation: Callister, G. (2021). Britain’s Not-so-Grand Strategy: The Projected Expedition Against the Texel,
1796. Academia Letters, Article 3049. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3049.
2
©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0
that resurfaced periodically throughout the war.8
In addition to a perceived strategic necessity, there was also a distinct feeling in British
military and political circles that any expedition might meet little resistance. British opinion
had, by 1796, persuaded itself that the Dutch were less than enthusiastic about their new
French alliance and that they were as likely to support as to oppose British military action.9
A War Office memorandum in September 1796 averred that the weak Dutch garrison troops
– projected at no more than 2,000 men – ‘are so averse to the present government that they
would not make much opposition’, and that ‘of the peasantry, seafaring and laboring people in
general, I am of the opinion it is only necessary to offer them a little assistance to rid themselves
of their tyrants’.10 This, it was thought, would negate some of the danger to British forces,
and indeed there seems to have been an implicit hope that the expedition might have provoked
a wider crisis in Franco-Dutch relations.11 In this, the project certainly prefigured the Grand
Expedition of 1799, which was predicated on the notion of widespread Dutch support for a
British invasion.12 Any planned descent on the Netherlands was made more feasible, it was
felt, by the supposedly favorable disposition of the target population.
Due to its perceived strategic importance, the planners took pains to keep the proposed
expedition secret. Those who knew about the preparations had little inkling of the destination,
with newspaper speculation naming Flushing as a target, and the official word being spread
that the troops were intended for the defense of Portugal.13 Some soldiers believed that they
were embarking for Gibraltar.14 In maintaining a degree of secrecy the expedition was doubt-
less aided by its relatively small scale; the 1,500 soldiers were embarked on only four troop-
ships and attracted little attention, unlike the major invasion of the Netherlands three years
later, which employed almost three hundred transport vessels.15 Nevertheless, there were in-
dications that the Dutch became aware of the threat; a naval reconnaissance in late October
found no signs of Dutch shipping, which was interpreted as a sign that they had gotten wind
8British Library, London (BL), Add MSS 38243, correspondence between Liverpool and Lt Gen. Don, 24 &
27 October 1809; George Spencer (ed. Julian Corbett & H. W. Richmond), Private Papers of George, Second
Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty 1794-1801 (4 vols, London: Navy Records Society, 1913-1924), vol. 4,
p.286.
9Graeme Callister, War, Public Opinion and Policy in Britain, France and the Netherlands, 1785-1815 (Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp.232-34
10TNA, WO 1/178, ’Remarks and suggestions on the probability of capturing the Dutch fleet by attacking it at
anchor in the Texel’, 24 September 1796.
11Spencer, Private Papers, vol. 1, pp.302-303, Buckingham to Spencer, 28 September 1796.
12Callister, War, Public Opinion and Policy, pp.267-68.
13Star and Evening Advertiser, 11 November 1796; Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. IV, p.521.
14London Chronicle, 10 November 1796; The Times, 12 November 1796.
15Camperdown, Admiral Duncan, p.79; Knight, Britain Against Napoleon, pp.192-93.
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of the impending attack.16
The need to attack Dutch shipping at anchor meant that the 1796 expedition was planned
as an amphibious operation, calling for close cooperation between naval and land forces. Dun-
can’s North Sea Fleet would provide the bulk of the fighting force, while the land troops would
consist of the 10th and 87th Regiments under Doyle. The operational plan was risky. It was
intended that Duncan’s ships would sail into the Texel to grapple with the Dutch vessels, while
the small force of infantry, supported by Duncan’s marines, would land to capture the enemy
shore batteries to ensure the navy’s safe passage.17 The troops and commanders involved
had a little track record of amphibious operations; indeed, the British in general could at this
stage boast few successfully combined maneuvers, and such expeditions were often riven by
interservice rivalry.18 The largest risk came perhaps for the land forces. Doyle’s orders were
vague, commanding him only to assault and take the enemy positions on Texel Island and
Den Helder, without showing any particular appreciation of the situation he might face. In
the absence of firm intelligence, it was by no means guaranteed that the soldiers would be able
to capture their objectives, notwithstanding the potential disaffection of the Dutch garrison,
and even if they did so there was no certainty of a safe withdrawal.19 Despite Duncan’s orders
to take every care to secure the retreat of the troops, enemy action or the ever-present risk of
bad weather might easily prevent re-embarkation, as it would to disastrous effect at Ostend in
May 1798, necessitating the surrender of almost the entire expeditionary force.20 To add to
the difficulties, the expedition was not ordered to proceed until 12 October, when conditions
in the North Sea were far from favorable for amphibious action. Even if the passage of Den
Helder was secured against hostile land batteries, the difficulties facing the fleet in carrying
out its seaborne assault in the relatively shallow anchorage remained significant. However, the
prospect of neutralizing the enemy navy and easing the burden of blockade proved tempting
enough for London to order the endeavor.21
In the event, however, no attack took place. Poor weather off the Dutch coast left Duncan
unwilling to risk his ships, while Doyle agreed that a successful landing in such conditions
would be impossible. After cruising off the Texel for a fortnight waiting in vain for a change in
16TNA, WO 1/178, Doyle to Henry Dundas, 30 October 1796.
17TNA, WO 1/178, Doyle to Henry Dundas, 30 October 1796.
18Sutcliffe, British Expeditionary Warfare, pp.124-25. Public Characters of 1806 (London: Richard Phillips,
1806), p.64 claimed that ‘perfect cordiality’ subsisted between Doyle and Duncan, although of course the rela-
tionship was never tested under fire.
19TNA, WO 1/178, Dundas to Doyle, 10 October 1796.
20Camperdown, Admiral Duncan, p.80;Sutcliffe, British Expeditionary Warfare, p.127; Hall, British Strategy,
p.83.
21TNA, WO 1/178, Dundas to Doyle, 10 October 1796.
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the weather, Duncan dispatched the troopships for home. He remained on station for another
three weeks before deteriorating conditions drove him back to port, having achieved nothing
other than the capture of a rich prize returning from Batavia.22 By this stage the immediate
strategic imperative for a pre-emptive strike had in any case diminished; new intelligence
reports highlighted the continued lack of preparedness of the Dutch fleet, while the turning
weather was thought to render the likelihood of a Dutch sortie remote.23
The 1796 expedition, as uneventful as it proved, remains of interest. It highlights the
continued strategic concern over the sensitive North Sea littoral, and the continued belief
that the Dutch remained, at heart, friends of Great Britain. The vague orders, lack of up-
to-date intelligence, and the wholly inappropriate season of the year also point to the rather
clumsy nature of military preparations. In this the 1796 expedition highlights issues that would
influence and dog British expeditions in the Low Countries for the next decade and more.
22Oracle, 12 November 1796
23Colenbrander (ed.), Gedenkstukken, vol. II, p.367, Barclay to Canning, 9 November 1796; Morning Chroni-
cle, 7 November 1796.
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